(Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis by Carter, J. Adam & Czarnecki, Bolesław
Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
(Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the SufficiencyThesis
J. Adam Carter
University of Edinburgh
j.adam.carter@ed.ac.uk
Bolesław Czarnecki
University of Edinburgh
boleslaw.czarnecki@ed.ac.uk
Abstract: Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ,
it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently,
a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases
where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking
knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese
(2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons,
that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient
for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-
intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains
unscathed.
1. introduction
In virtue of what does one know how to do something, when one does? One promi-
nent view, intellectualism, maintains that what grounds one’s knowledge how to' is at
least always in part one’s propositional attitudes; thus, on this picture, when you know
how to ride a bike, this will be in virtue of certain propositional attitudes you have.
Anti-intellectualists insist that when you know how to ride a bike, it is in virtue of
your possessing certain abilities or dispositions, and not in virtue of any propositions
you believe or know.
Whilst anti-intellectualismhas been the received view in the epistemological land-
scape since Ryle (1945; 1949), the tide has shifting. Most famously, this has been due
1
2to the emergence of linguistic arguments for intellectualism, most notably by Stan-
ley and Williamson (2001)1. However, another important recent expression of ‘anti-
anti-intellectualist’ thinking has come by way of counterexamples aimed at revealing
the old Rylean view to be untenable. Two notable expressions of this shift are found
in recent work by John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2007; 2011a, 2011b)2, and Car-
lotta Pavese (e.g., 2015a), who take issue with the material adequacy of the core anti-
intellectualist insight, but for different reasons.
Bengson & Moffett contend, by way of several athletic-themed counterexamples,
that possessing the ability to ' is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing-how
to '. Moreover, they suggest that the counterexamples they’ve adduced to this end
reveal a structural flaw in the anti-intellectualist position that is ultimately intractable3.
Pavese, by contrast, challenges the anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis by way of a
sophisticated example involving rule following.
We think the conclusion that anti-intellectualism can be dismissed on the basis of
such examples is at best premature. While we have reservations about Bengson and
Moffett’s cases against the necessity leg of the anti-intellectualist’s thesis4, our focus
in this paper will be on Bengson &Moffett’s and Pavese’s purported counterexamples
to the sufficiency leg of the thesis. We examine carefully their alleged arguments-by-
counterexample and show them to be unpersuasive. While we are not, in what follows,
setting out to establish the correctness of anti-intellectualism, what we hope to show is
that the view cannot so easily be dismissed by way of ‘knock-down’ counterexamples
as its critics have supposed.
2. three cases: salchow, kytoon and swimmer
2.1. Salchows and the ability condition
According to anti-intellectualists, having the ability to ' is widely taken to be not
merely necessary for knowing how to '. But, importantly for what follows, it is also
regarded a sufficient condition for knowing how to do so, though this point needs a
quick adjustment. It is obviously false that, were Tim to possess an unreliable ability
to pick a lock (suppose for instance Tim’s lock picking success rate is .001) that he
thereby counts as knowing how to pick a lock. Accordingly, and following Bengson&
Moffett, we can restrict the anti-intellectualist’s claim about the sufficiency of ability
for know-how as follows:
1For some other notable defences of this strategy, see Stanley (2011a, 2011b); Brogaard (2008, 2009,
2011); Bengson & Moffett (2011b); Pavese (2015b).
2See also Bengson, Moffett & Wright (2009)
3See here Bengson & Moffett (2011b, 174) for an explicit statement of this charge.
4See, most notably, Bengson & Moffett’s (2011b) example of ‘Pat’ the ski coach.
3Anti-intellectualism (Sufficiency) [AI-S] Being reliably able to ' is suffi-
cient for knowing how to '.
Consider though the following example, offered by Bengson & Moffett (hence-
forth B&M):
SALCHOW. Irina, who is a novice figure skater, decides to try a com-
plex jump called the salchow. When one performs a salchow, one takes
off from the back inside edge of one skate and lands on the back outside
edge of the opposite skate after one or more rotations in the air. Irina,
however, is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow. She be-
lieves incorrectly that the way to perform a salchow is to take off from
the front outside edge of one skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the
front inside edge of the other skate. However, Irina has a severe neurolog-
ical abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from
how she actually thinks she is acting. So despite the fact that she is seri-
ously mistaken about how to perform a salchow, whenever she actually
attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her misconceptions), the
abnormality causes Irina to unknowingly perform the correct sequence
of moves, and so she ends up successfully performing a salchow. Al-
though what she is doing and what she thinks she is doing come apart,
she fails to notice the mismatch.
Let us begin by clarifying B&M’s rationale for thinking that SALCHOW counts
against AI-S. As they see it, ‘In this case, it is clear that Irina is reliably able to do
a salchow. However, because of her confusions regarding how to execute the move,
she cannot be said to know how to do a salchow’ (Bengson & Moffett 2011b, 172).
There are two elements to B&M’s diagnosis, each mapping on to a separate issue: the
first pertains to the issue of whether Irina fails to know how to do a salchow, given her
confusion5; their second pertains to thematter of whether Irina has the reliable ability
to do a salchow.
At least, prima facie, both of these elements of the diagnosis look to be on safe
ground. For one thing, surely the confusion Irina is claimed to exhibit is enough to
prevent her from plausibly knowing how to do a salchow. At any rate, we won’t be
challenging this first element of their diagnosis6. Moreover, to their credit, given that
5Although we bracket the issue for the purposes of our discussion, B&M’s case of neurological dis-
order may be contested on empirical grounds. As we have been advised, it is highly unlikely that any
remotely similar condition has ever been experimentally diagnosed.
6This is not to say that this element of the diagnosis is not entirely free from potential criticism. For
example, on a particularly permissive conception of ability possession operant in an account of know-
4‘whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her misconcep-
tions), the abnormality causes Irina to unknowingly perform the correct sequence of
moves’, it looks on first blush like Irina’s possessing a reliable ability to perform the
salchow is uncontroversial. It is no wonder B&M have relied on this case on multiple
occasions to make their argument.
That said, there are a number of lurking problems waiting in the wings. To bring
one such initial problem to the fore, consider Plantinga’s (1993) famous ‘brain lesion’
case. In Plantinga’s brain lesion case, we are to imagine that our hero, ‘Al’, has a strange
brain lesion that reliably causes him to believe that he has a brain lesion—though Al
has no other item of evidence that supports this conclusion.
One of the lessons in the literature on early reliabilist epistemology is that it’s bad
news if (on one’s view) Al counts as knowing he has a brain lesion7, even though the
brain lesion reliably causes Al to believe correctly on the point. A popular explana-
tion that can be offered for why Al fails to know that he has a brain lesion proceeds
as follows: firstly, knowledge requires that a belief ’s correctness be (in some suitably
articulated sense) attributable to the agent’s exercise of cognitive ability8; secondly—
and what is most relevant to our purposes—Al’s believing the truth does not seem to
be grounded in any ability to which we can credit Al (Greco 2010, 151)9.
We’ll consider shortly the implications of this way of thinking about Al’s situa-
tion has for B&M’s diagnosis of SALCHOW. But first, let’s move from the brain lesion
case to an even more radical case in the reliabilist literature: Lehrer’s (1990) case of
‘TrueTemp’ who has (unbeknownst to him) a temperature-detecting device implanted
in his head that regularly causes him to proclaim accurate beliefs about the ambient
temperature10. Temp, we are told, is never wrong about the ambient temperature
(though he can’t tell you why).
Of course, there are a number of things one might be tempted to say when criti-
cising Temp’s epistemic standing. But at least one natural reaction will be to deny that
Temp’s correctness is down to any of Temp’s own abilities, for much the same reason
how—where the kind of ability at issue is no different from the kind a glass has to shatter—then one
might be tempted to challenge this element of B&M’s diagnosis and insist that the confusion caused by
the abnormality is irrelevant to whether Irina knows how to do the salchow. While we recognize that
such a line is available, we will not be pursuing it here (as motivating an objection to B&M), though we
do engage with the related issue such an objection intimates in some detail later in the paper.
7For some representative statements of this point, see, along with Plantinga (1993), Goldman (2011)
and Greco (2010).
8For defences of an ability condition on knowledge, see Greco (2010), Sosa (1993; 2007; 2009),
Pritchard (2012), and Carter (2013).
9Greco (2010), drawing from Feinberg (1970) remarks that ‘we do not consider an action to be ap-
propriately his unless it is appropriately grounded in psychologically normal and healthy character (Greco
2010, 151). We articulate this suggestion further later in this section.
10This paraphrasing of the case is taken from Goldman (2011).
5we are inclined to not credit Al’s correctness about his brain lesion to some ability he
has. After all, despite TrueTemp’s reliability, his correctness is (like in the case with Al)
nonetheless not a production of his own efforts or faculties, but rather, the production
of a cause external to his cognitive agency11.
The implications of these insights about Al and Temp for B&M’s diagnosis of Irina
now take shape. Just consider that, to the extent that we should resist, following ortho-
doxy in the brain lesion and TrueTemp cases, the attribution of Al’s and TrueTemp’s
correctness to Al’s and TrueTemp’s ‘abilities’, we have located a precedent for refrain-
ing from attributing to an individual a ability to do something even when she reliably
can do the thing in question successfully. The precedent revealed in the brain lesion
and TrueTemp cases, and which has been given expression in a number of works by
John Greco (e.g. 2008; 2010; 2013) as well as Duncan Pritchard (201012) is, in short,
that it is appropriate to credit to an agent an ability to perform a given intelligent ac-
tion only if that ability it is grounded in dispositions that are integrated in—and so,
like in Alvin’s and Temp’s cases, not disintegrated from—the agent’s cognitive psy-
chology. Such integration requires, as Greco notes, stability, in a sense that will not be
satisfied by fleeting processes, such Al’s brain lesion or, say, temporary but perfectly
reliable echolocation. Though, even if we were to assume that Irina’s condition were
one she had since birth (and as such is notmerely fleeting or temporary) one’s ability is
not appropriately integrated in one’s cognitive psychology—or, as Greco puts it, one’s
cognitive character—unless there is a kind of basic coherence condition is satisfied.
Jonathan Kvanvig, (2003a) suggests such a condition is not met in brain-lesion-style
cases where the reliable process is disintegrated from one’s cognitive psychology. As
Kvanvig remarks:
What goes wrong is […] a matter of lack of coherence between the un-
derstanding a person has of the reliability of various ways of forming and
holding beliefs and how the beliefs are formed in these cases (2003a, 454).
Such lack of coherence is present not only in the brain lesion and TrueTemp cases,
but moreover, when Irina’s ‘severe neurological abnormalities’ cause a mismatch be-
tween what Irina does and what she thinks she is doing.
There is thus an established rationale for thinking that we should, and contrary
to what B&M suggest in leveraging their attempted counterexample, not attribute the
successful salchow to any ability to which we can credit Irina anymore than we should
(and as Greco thinks we should not) attribute Al’s correct brain lesion belief to an
ability of Al’s (or for that matter credit TrueTemp’s correct temperature belief to some
11On this point, see Pritchard (2010) and Beebe (2004).
12Pritchard (2010), in particular, focuses in the relevance of cognitive integration to cognitive ability.
6ability TrueTemp has himself). In each of the three cases, the brain lesion case, the
TrueTemp case, and in the case of Irina, we have instances in which what causes the
relevant success is not appropriately integrated in the agent’s cognitive psychology to
warrant an attribution of the success in question to the agent’s own ability13 If this
line of thinking is right, then we have a principled reason to reject one leg of B&M’s
diagnosis of SALCHOW: namely, that Irina has the ability to reliably perform the sal-
chow14.
Granted, someprominent anti-intellectualists, for instance, Noë (2005) andHornsby
(2012), do not explicitly insist that a Greco-style integration condition must be satis-
fied with respect to the kinds of abilities that ground anti-intellectualist know-how.
One might be tempted to insist on this basis that whatever kind of integration into
one’s cognitive character is required in order to rightly ascribe to an agent a cognitive
ability, of the sort Greco and virtue epistemologists are interested in, shouldn’t also
be thought to be demanded of agential abilities more generally that are notmanifestly
cognitive. And thus, as this line of thinking might go, the fact that Irina’s abnormality
is connected with her successful performance in a way that is relevantly similar to Al
and Temp, should not lead us to, on this basis, withhold attributing to Irina an ability
to do the salchow, even if we followGreco (andmore generally virtue epistemologists)
and deny attributing in the respective cases cognitive abilities (vis-à-vis the relevant
successes) to Al and Temp.
We submit two kinds of response to such a line of thinking, the first an observation
and the second, a kind of ‘dilemma’ we raise to a proponent of the kind of line just
sketched. Firstly, the observation is that even if anti-intellectualists don’t often insist,
explicitly, on an integration condition, as such, this should not be entirely surprising
because the literature on ability and integration has its origin in mainstream episte-
mology, where specifically cognitive abilities have been the salient point of focus, and
not in the theory of action. Put another way: it has been, specifically, epistemological
problems (e.g. objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and epistemic justifica-
tion) which originally generated a need to clarify why the attribution to an agent of
certain abilities should be withheld in certain cases even when that agent performs
certain tasks reliably successfully. This need in fact is (arguably) a central explanation
for the contemporary shift over the past two decades from standard process reliabilism
to virtue reliabilism in mainstream epistemology. Thus, then, from the fact that some
anti-intellectualists whose approach to knowledge-how is philosophically rooted in
(in the case of Noë and Hornsby) the philosophy of cognitive science and action the-
13For a potential reply on behalf of B&M, see §2.3. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Pacific Philo-
sophical Quarterly for stimulating the discussion in that section.
14A separate issue is the extent to which it matters that she can do a salchow reliably, despite lacking
an ability to do so that we are willing to attribute to her. We take up this issue in §2.2.
7ory, respectively, don’t already advert explicitly to integrationist language needn’t be
a strike against the suggestion that such a condition is plausible. Moreover, recent de-
velopments in the philosophy of action, and in particular works by Mayr (2011) and
Stout (2006) whose focus is in part on so-called deviant causal chains, suggest, despite
lack of straightforward equivalence, that this integrationist approach is on the right
track.
The second response to the line of ‘disanalogy’ objection we outlined above is to
raise a dilemma. In doing so, we want to first note that we grant, without reserva-
tion, that there are certain kinds of ability attributions which are felicitious in English
and which nonetheless don’t plausibly involve attributing (anything in the neighbour-
hood of) know-how. Consider, to this end, firstly a (significantly) attenuated variety
of ability attribution that, unlike the case of typical agential abilities, requires nothing
more than doing the thing in question. In particular, it will be helpful to highlight J.L.
Austin’s case of the golfer who holes a difficult golf shot, we may suppose, through a
shaky stroke, perhaps caused by a spasm, and an unlikely bounce off a tree. As Austin
(1956, 218) remarks:
‘it follows merely from the premise that he does it, that he has the ability
to do it, according to ordinary English’ (Austin 1956, 218).
What we want to stress is that the fact that ordinary English permits some very
lax attributions of abilities, where fluky success is all that’s required, does not go very
far to suggest that the kind of ability anti-intellectualists have in mind, when insisting
that knowledge-how is grounded in abilities, is nothing more than what we can say of
Austin’s golfer. Maier (2014) comments on this case: ‘On the other hand, there seems
also to be a sense in which abilities are somewhat more demanding than this. This is
the sense in which fluky success, as in the case of the golfer, is not sufficient for ability.’
Thus there are clearly multiple senses of abilities, and challenging anti-intellectualism
(along the sufficiency dimension) must involve cases where knowledge-how is not
present while what is present is the kind of ability that is more demanding than some
of the laxest cases of ability attributions (e.g. Austin’s case) which seem felicitious.
Just as Austin’s golfer is an example of a strongly attenuated instance of an ability
attribution that is felicitous in English and yet which clearly fails to capture the kind
of ability that any plausible construal of anti-intellectualism is adverting to, we should
note that there is also amoderately attenuated variety of ability attribution, also felic-
itous in English, but also which applies to cases where know-how can’t very plausibly
be present. For example, we might say “the glass is able to withstand the pressure of
the child’s grip”. In this case “is able to” is really just shorthand to “is disposed to.” On
a simple subjunctive conditional analysis of dispositions, an object o is disposed to ac-
tivity A in condition C if and only if o would A if C were the case. (Choi & Fara 2012;
8Lewis 1997). And, according to standard semantics for subjunctive conditionals, o
would A if C were the case provided o As in all close C-worlds (Alfano 2014). But of
course an individual might, with reference to this analysis, be disposed to do some-
thing that is entirely unconnected to her agency. For example, one might be disposed,
as in a religious ceremony, to speak glossolalia, but in a way that is self-consciously dis-
connected from one’s agency.
For example, 17th century Quaker Edward Burrough describes speaking glosso-
lalia as if, from his perspective, compelled by God to do the speaking, or more ac-
curately, as if God was speaking through them. As he put it: “We spoke with new
tongues, as the Lord gave us utterance, and His Spirit led us15”. The gap between Bur-
rough’s disposition to speak glossolalia in certain religious contexts (in virtue of which
an attenuated ability attribution might be felicitous, e.g. as when using Burroughs as a
contrast case vis-à-vis others parishoners in the church who spoke nothing) and what
would be Burrough’s knowing how to speak glossolalia seems to a be a gap in place pre-
cisely because, in speaking glossolalia, one is compulsed or compelled to do so in a way
where the disposition to perform glossolalia is not appropriately integrated within the
individual’s agency and psychology. (Perhaps, this is precisely why Burroughs said ‘as
the Lord gave us utterance.’
The dilemma for the proponent of the line envisioned, then, is that one can at-
tempt to draw a principled disanalogy between the kind of integration conditions on
ability that, inmainstream epistemology, are regarded to be failed byAl andTemp, and
the kind of integrations that must be satisfied in the case of (non-distinctly cognitive)
agential abilities, only if one is prepared to (uncharitably, and implausibly) attribute
to the anti-intellectualist a view according to which the kind of disposition that aligns
with attenuated ability attributions (e.g. those secured simply by disposition posses-
sion) is taken to be the essence of knowledge how. And, as we’ve suggested, this strikes
us as an implausible characterization of the kind of ability any plausible formulation
of anti-intellectualism will advert to16.
15Burrough, Edward (1831) [1659]. “Epistle to the Reader” in G. FoxThe Great Mystery of the Great
Whore Unfolded; and Antichrist’s Kingdom Revealed unto Destruction. The Works of George Fox. Our
italics.
16Obviously, if anti-intellectualists really did want to say that (say) Austin’s golfer knows how tomake
the shot (because there is one reading in English on which an ability attribution to him is felicitious) and
Burroughs knows how to speak glossolalia (because there is a kind of ability attribution that tracks be-
ing disposed to do something, and Burroughs is disposed to speak glossolalia in certain circumstances,
despite it’s being utterly disconnected with his agency), then anti-intellectualism would be a wildly im-
plausible account of knowledge-how.
92.2. Salchows and cognitive character: a closer look
Another line of reply to the foregoing is to press further an alleged disanalogy be-
tween Irina’s neurological condition in SALCHOW with the objectionable kinds of
cases we’ve considered where we are inclined not to attribute the relevant ability to
the agent in question. Put another way: why is Irina’s cognitive abnormality in this
case sufficiently problematic from the perspective of crediting to her an ability to do
the jump? On this point it will be helpful to investigatemore carefully Irina’s situation.
Interestingly, we think B&M’s example lends itself to at least two interpretations
vis-à-vis the matter of how the abnormality is connected to the successful performance.
On one interpretation, when ‘the abnormality causes Irina to unknowingly perform
the correct sequence ofmoves’ (Bengson&Moffett 2011b, 172, our italics), it results in
something like Irina’s compulsively performing a salchow. And this strikes us as a clear
case of disintegration of one’s cognitive character; indeed, this is precisely the kind of
disintegration one finds with Al and TrueTemp, and we’ve explained our diagnosis of
the case on this reading.
However, it is possible to conceive of Irina’s abnormality in a different way: as
a peculiar instance of mere dissociation of her doxastic failures from her manual suc-
cesses, where those successes and failures are, nevertheless, appropriately integrated in
some way into her cognitive character. Call this the dissociative interpretation of the
case. On the dissociative interpretation, the abnormality doesn’t cause Irina’s success-
ful performance, per se. Instead (i) the abnormality prevents Irina from ever forming
a true (meta)-belief that her belief that some w is a way to perform a salchow is false,
even though (ii) it has no impact whatsoever on her successful performance.
Now, onemight argue as follows: SALCHOW isn’t successful as a counterexample
against AI-S on a disintegration reading; but the explanation for why this is so on a
disintegration reading doesn’t apply, mutatis mutandis, on the dissociative reading.
And further, the dissociative reading is (perhaps) even more faithful to B&M’s own
presentation of the case. Thus, the reasons for rejecting that SALCHOW succeeds
against AI-S on the basis of claimed similarities between Irina, Al and Temp would
no longer be compelling were we to interpret Irina’s case along dissociative lines.
Is this general strategy plausible? We think not. To see why, consider that, on the
dissociative reading, there are two dimensions of Irina’s cognitive character which are
relevant: doxastic andmanual. A relevant question thus becomes: can we credit Irina
an ability to perform a salchow with reference to either of these dissociated dimensions
of her cognitive character? As we’ll see, the prospects do not look very good, though
for different reasons.
Firstly, with respect to the doxastic dimension, it’s clear that Irina is a dysfunc-
tional agent. Presumably, many if not all of her beliefs about how to perform a salchow
are false. Surely, were Irina stipulated to have the ability to do a salchow, it wouldn’t
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be in virtue of her confused beliefs, but rather despite them. So the doxastic dimension
of Irina’s character doesn’t look promising as undergirding an explanation for why we
should credit to her an ability to perform a salchow.
Manually, however, Irina is perfectly fine, i.e. Irina’s performances of salchows
bear no symptoms of her (abundant) cognitive deficit. But if the manual dimension
of her cognitive character is all that’s at issue (and thus, if the doxastic dimension is
ignored), then the fact that Irina happens to believe incorrectly that some w is the
way to perform the salchow becomes irrelevant—given that her performance bears
no symptoms of this cognitive error. But if we focus on just the manual dimension
of Irina’s cognitive character at the exclusion of the doxastic dimension, it becomes
hard to see how Irina would not only count as having an ability to do a salchow, but
further, to know how to do a salchow—a result that conflicts with a key (and plausible)
element of B&M’s diagnosis of the case.
Now, we envision that on the dissociative interpretation, B&M might (again, by
redirecting attention to Irina’s false belief) encourage us to nonetheless deny that Irina
knows how to perform a salchow, But this move should strike one as problematic.
To consider why, by example, just imagine a parallel kind of dissociation case: one
that is just a minor modification of a paradigmatic case of know how—viz., that of
attributing to Chopin know-how vis-à-vis the performance of the Minute Waltz. Let
Chopin* be just like Chopin, thoughChopin* has a belief, which has no bearing on his
performance of the piece, that some note n should be an ‘A’ rather than an ‘E’. When
performing the Minute Waltz, Chopin* does not attend to this belief—nor reflect on
it, in any way, and nor is his performance in any respect guided by this false belief.
We think it would be at best controversial to attribute know how to Chopin but not
Chopin*, and by parity of reasoning, to deny know-how to Irina on the dissociative
reading, where her situation is structurally similar to Chopin*. Thus, B&Mwould not
be in a position to embrace the dissociative reading in the service of demonstrating
that SALCHOW is a counterexample to AI-S anymore than they can embrace the
disintegrative reading. This, at any rate, is the line we want to advance.
We want to briefly consider now two potential objections with this last move, in
which we appeal to the Chopin analogy to suggest why a dissociative reading of SAL-
CHOW isn’t going to help B&M appeal to this case as a counterexample to AI-S. The
first worry is that mistaking a single note in the Minute Waltz is not really on a par
with Irina’s mistake about the way to perform a salchow. A second worry is that, at
least in B&M’s (2007) presentation of the SALCHOW case, they envision Irina’s false
belief as in fact playing a role in her behavior, contrary to the dissociative reading of
their case.
Regarding the first issue, the analogy as presented strikes us as close enough in the
relevant respect that, in each respective example case, there is some false belief about
how to perform the action in question that (ex hypothesi) is nonetheless not attended
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to in the course of the successful performance. The only difference is that in the piano
case, the false belief seems proportionately less significant to the total performance.
Though, we think this difference is not a significant one once it is emphasized that
a successful performance of the Minute Waltz involves notes played in a particular
order. However, even if we were to grant that the disanalogy were problematically
significant, we could then simply run a variation on the Chopin case in which, say, the
mistaken beliefs (that played no role in guiding the performance) concerned three or
four notes out of sequence. This at any rate would seem to bring the case closer to the
SALCHOW case for anyone dissatisfied by the analogy on the basis of the considered
objection.
Regarding the second issue. Note that we are not attributing the dissociative read-
ing of the case to B&M. Rather, we are exploring this as (along with the disintegrative
reading) one of two very natural ways to think about themismatch between Irina’s be-
lief and her successful performance, on the basis of which B&M argued SALCHOW
to be a counterexample to AI-S. We then suggested that neither interpretation of the
mismatch B&M advert to will ultimately support a diagnosis of SALCHOW as a suc-
cessful counterexample. Thus the examination of the dissociative reading of the case
(and the relevance of our considering this case for our argument) does not depend on
B&M actually endorsing this reading.
2.3. Objections and Discussion
It will be instructive to consider a potential reply, at this juncture, on behalf of B&M
concerning the point about ability and integration. Once it becomes clear that, as our
anti-intellectualist insists, know-how is best understood as identified not just with an
ability, but with an ability which is sufficiently integrated with one’s cognitive psychol-
ogy, then it looks increasingly as though such an ability is to be grounded on some
cognitive states (such as understanding, according to B&M’s view).
This line of reply is interesting because it raises theworry that, for the anti-intellectualist
at least, adverting to the cognitive integration move we’ve advanced (in response to
B&M’s proposed counterexample) provides in effect a kind of ‘double-edged sword’, in
that the reply lends itself to an interpretation on which it looks like it supports B&M’s
own idiosyncratic variety of non-propositional intellectualism. After all, on B&M’s
(2011a) version of (non-propositional) intellectualism, ‘to know how to φ is to stand
in an objectual understanding relation to a way of φ–ing’ (2011a, 189). While this
envisioned line of response—viz., according to which the cognitive integration line
ultimately plays into B&M’s hand—is a clever one, we think it doesn’t stick.
To appreciate why, consider closely B&M’s rationale for identifying their position
as a version of intellectualism in the first place. This is, they write, ‘because an un-
derstanding of a way, while not reducible to or a species of propositional attitude, is
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partially grounded in propositional attitudes (Ibid., 188).’ Here is, as we see it, the
crux of the matter: if insisting, as we have, that the kind of abilities a plausible version
of anti-intellectualism will identify with know-how must be integrated within one’s
cognitive psychology (in the way we’ve described in the foregoing) carries with it a
commitment to a further metaphysical grounding claim to the effect that the abilities
must be grounded in states such as propositional attitudes, then the double-edge sword
charge sticks. However, the cognitive integration line we’ve advanced needn’t carry
with it such a further metaphysical grounding claim. Consider, as Greco (2010) puts
it, that ‘cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooper-
ative interaction with other aspects of the cognitive system’ (2010, 152, our italics).
Evidently, facts about whether certain things interact and cooperate in certain ways—
viz., the facts that are of primary relevance to whether the kind of integration condi-
tion is satisfied are met—don’t themselves entail facts about metaphysical grounding.
And again, only if they did entail such facts, would adverting to the cognitive integra-
tion move, in the way we have, play into the hand of B&M; the line we’ve advanced is,
in short, perfectly compatible with a denial of B&M’s idiosyncratic brand of intellec-
tualism.
In response to this point, the proponent of the reply envisioned on behalf of B&M
might suggest that the dialectical burden at this juncture is on the anti-intellectualist to
show how (cognitively integrated) abilities cannot themselves be explained in terms
of knowledge or other cognitive states. While we think this way of thinking about
the dialectical burden loads the cards unfairly against us (given our defensive aim
in this paper), we nonetheless have a further line to press here, one which one of
the present authors (Carter, with Pritchard 2015a; cf., Carter, with Poston forthcom-
ing) has defended in more detail elsewhere, when engaging specifically with B&M’s
non-propositional intellectualism. The worry is that, at least on several popular ways
of thinking about what objectual understanding involves (e.g. Kvanvig 2003b; Riggs
2009; Hills 2009; Grimm 2014; Carter and Gordon 2014), objectual understanding is,
itself, explained in terms of cognitive abilities, viz., as Kvanvig puts it, to grasp relevant
explanatory or coherence-making relationships. While we don’t have the space here
to defend such a view of objectual understanding in detail, it should suffice to note
that this is a popular position in the contemporary literature and, to the extent that it
is right, there is reason to doubt that Bengson & Moffett’s own view is (as they claim)
a bona fide version of intellectualism.
The upshot of this final point is that we might, as it were, turn the tables and sug-
gest that even if the cognitive integration line we’ve defended in the foregoing were a
fillip to Bengson & Moffett’s own idiosyncratic, understanding-driven variety of self-
described intellectualism (a point we’ve already cast doubt upon), there is a precedent
in contemporary thinking about objectual understanding with reference to which it’s
not at all clear why we should think of their position as, at the end of the day, intellec-
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tualist, rather than anti-intellectualist. We don’t however, regard ourselves as relying
on this final point in order to meet the line of reply.
It is important to note that we do not regard our cognitive-integrationist counter-
reply to B&M’s salchow counterexample to be an all-things-considered vindication of
the sufficiency leg of the anti-intellectualist’s thesis. A thorough defence of the thesis
(or of a particular formulation of it) is beyond what we’ve attempted to do here. Ad-
mittedly, there are a plethora of arguments present in the literature to keep any anti-
intellectualist awake, whether virtue or otherwise.17 Instead, in line with our previous
arguments we hold that B&M’s (original or adopted) arguments rest on assumptions
which—when brought to light from a broadly integrationist perspective—(i) do not
look particularly damaging to an anti-intellectualist who more or less explicitly em-
braces that perspective; and—as the dissociative reading suggests—(ii) ultimately turn
against rather than support B&M’s vision of intellectualism.
Nonetheless, at this point it will be helpful to consider, albeit briefly, another sce-
nario discussed by B&M entitled “SWIMMER”18.
SWIMMER. Sally, who is an inexperienced hiker with extremely poor
vision, decides to go snow shoeing through the mountains in February.
As she is hiking along, an avalanche suddenly starts and a rush of snow
sweeps down the mountain and over Sally. Sally, however, mistakenly
takes the snow to be a body ofwater (she believes incorrectly that a nearby
damn has broken) and so she responds by making rapid swimming mo-
tions. Sally aims to swim through the water towards the surface. Though
Sally has never heard of this fact before, making swimming motions is a
way to escape avalanches. As a result of her lucky mistake, Sally is able to
escape from the avalanche. (Bengson, Moffett, & Wright, 2008, pp. 395–
396)
In short, the protagonist of SwimmeR, Sally, is making motions characteristic
enough of swimming for one to call these, without hesitation, “swimming motions”.
Moreover, she successfully employs these motions in trying to escape an avalanche.
17There are many strands to the sufficiency plot. B&M’s salchow argument presupposes a deviant
causal-chains scheme. Other influential challenges advert to the de re/de dicto distinction and opac-
ity (e.g. Steel 1974; Carr 1981) and to the fineness vs. coarseness of grain of content of knowledge-how
against ability ascriptions (e.g. Snowdon 2004). Note that the sufficiency problem is often already re-
stricted to certain selected contexts of ascriptions. In some of the most prominent proposals, this fact is
reflected byweak (Glick 2011, Fridland 2012; see also Setiya (2012) for an interesting discussion of “basic
knowledge”) or disjunctive (Lihoreau 2008) approaches to knowledge-how vis-à-vis ability ascriptions.
These views may be broadly labelled, after Wiggins (2009), bifurcationist.
18Cf., Bengson & Moffett, (2012a), pp. 185–186, 188, 191 for a slightly altered interpretation which
does not affect our discussion of the case; see also Hawley (2003) who is the author of this example.
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B&M insist that an anti-intellectualist will incorrectly diagnose this case. Although
Sally is able to make the relevant motions, she doesn’t thereby know how to escape an
avalanche.
We raise this example because, even though it cannot be dispelled along disin-
tegrative or dissociative lines (should it be accommodated by the cognitive integra-
tionist), the pattern of (i) and (ii) still applies.19
First, in relation to (i), the anti-intellectualist who wishes to straightforwardly
maintain the sufficiency of the ability condition is not deprived of resources to rea-
sonably respond to the case. For instance, drawing on Ernest Sosa’s (2015) recent
distinction between three competence factors—seat, shape, and situation (triple S)—a
deeper interpretation of the SWIMMER becomes viable.20
Assuming that Sally is in the right sort of shape (e.g., not intoxicated, though
note that her poor vision may arouse suspicion), what remains to be examined is the
seat vis-à-vis her situation. Specifically, the question of primary importance here is
whether Sally’s ability—appropriate to swimming situations—is seated within Sally
as its bearer in a manner that makes that ability appropriate to the situation that is
avalanche-escaping.
Prompted by their objectualism21, B&M seem to impose on the anti-intellectualist
a sort of rigid essentialist view of seat, whereby the anti-intellectualist should accept
that the swimming-motion type of basis of ability when fitted into the avalanche type
of situation yields an overall competence that (erroneously) amounts to knowledge-
how to escape an avalanche.
However, it is available to the anti-intellectualist to reject such a rigid view of seat.
In addressing cases akin to SWIMMER, the anti-intellectualist can begin by insisting
instead on a more dynamic interplay between the seat and situation factors. Suppos-
ing that Sally’s original ability was seated in her within pool-swimming situations,
it isn’t hard to imagine that the re-seating it would involve a radical shift of con-
text from pool-swimming to avalanche-escaping and re-embedding it in the latter.22
19Thanks to an anonymous referee at Pacific Philosophical Quarterly for insisting that we clarify our
discussion of the SWIMMER case.
20See especially, pp. 95-106. Importantly, employing this distinction does not commit the anti-
intellectualist to Sosa’s view. Sosa’s framework has been chosen here primarily for heuristic purposes,
leaving aside the question of how proponents of other approaches may fill in or change the relevant de-
tails. To this end one may seek solutions in the literature on knowledge-how (e.g., Carter and Pritchard
2015) or build analogies with other accounts on the market, e.g., Greco (2010, 2012). See Kallestrup &
Pritchard (2016) for a recent discussion of differences between the Sosa’s, Greco’s and Pritchard’s ap-
proaches; see also Navarro, (2015).
21As outlined earlier in this section. See Bengson & Moffett (2011a, 189).
22We leave open the extent to which re-seating amounts to re-integrating within another context. It
is a subtle metaphysical matter of little interest for our general purposes whether new abilities derivative
on well integrated ones are just re-seated andmerely integrationally fine-tuned or re-seated and substan-
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That, in turn, would require muchmore than simply “removing” one’s swimmingmo-
tions from water and “inserting” these into snow—the kind of picture of re-seating
that B&M’s view implies when the objectual knowledge condition is inspected more
closely. Crucially, only once the swimming-motion ability—provided that it is al-
ready sufficiently integrated into Sally’s cognitive psychology—has become contextu-
ally relevant in this way, i.e., situationally re-seated, will it suffice for knowledge-how
to escape an avalanche.
This leads to the second point as per (ii). Assume along with the description of
SWIMMER that somehow Sally’s original ability is seated in a way that is outright ap-
propriate to an avalanche-escaping situation (which, we think, would require a form
of practical genius). Were that the case, a similar question arises as with the SAL-
CHOW case: Why should it matter that Sally has false beliefs vis-à-vis the avalanche
situation?
Accordingly, then, we maintain that the anti-intellectualist may easily resist the
force of SWIMMER by constraining knowledge-how only to those abilities which are
appropriately integrated and situationally seated.
2.4. The Kytoon Case
If the foregoing is right, then even though SALCHOW fails as a counterexample to
AI-S, one might still point out that the case remains a counterexample to a (much
stronger) ‘brute relibilist’ version of the sufficiency leg of the anti-intellectualist’s abil-
ity claim—formulated as:
Anti-intellectualism (Sufficiency-Strong) [AI-SW]: If one can reliably '
then one knows how to '.
However, and in line with our remarks toward the end of §2.1, it doesn’t much
matter that SALCHOW counts against this very strong version of the sufficiency leg
of the anti-intellectualist thesis. This is because AI-SW is effectively a ‘mad-dog’ re-
liabilist construal of the sufficiency leg of the thesis, one which drops entirely any
appeal to the notion of ability, and consequently, has very implausible consequences.
Consider for example an extreme case, in which an individual has a rare and com-
pletely debilitating form of anencephaly and accordingly, though in possession of a
brain stem, lacks a large portion of a normal human brain. Due to autonomic reflexes
controlled by the brain stem, let’s suppose this individual reliably 's. Though con-
temporary anti-intellectualists have not to our knowledge explicitly commented on
such a case, we suspect that ruling-in such an individual as knowing how to ' would
tially restructured and, hence, re-integrated. Either response seems plausible depending on the kind of
scenario at play.
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not be welcome. (After all, it’s very plausible that, from a neurophysiological perspec-
tive, the agent lacks the kind of cognitive architecture that would be needed to support
any knowledge23). Yet AI-SW rules such a case in, as the reliability condition is met.
AI-SW, note, is as implausible in the arena of knowledge-how as ‘mad-dog’ reliabil-
ism is often regarded. It is, in fact, a hallmark of anti-intellectualism that the mark of
knowledge how is ability possession—something AI-S preserves, but AI-SW doesn’t.
Since SALCHOW is not B&M’s only case against AI-S, it is worth considering
whether their other alleged counterexample might succeed where the former fails.
Consider KYTOON:
KYTOON. Chris forms the desire to build a kytoon—a lighter-than-air
kite that may, like a balloon, be filled with gas (e.g., hydrogen, hot air, or
helium). She has never built a kite before, let alone a kytoon. But she is
very goodwith her hands and thus is confident in her ability tomake one.
Seeking information about how to build a kytoon, information she cur-
rently lacks, Chris goes online and performs a Google search for “build-
ing a kytoon.” She finds a Web site with instructions. The instructions
are long, but she is able to understand and follow each step with a mod-
est amount of effort. Over the course of the next few days, she succeeds
in executing the steps. The result of her efforts is her own personal ky-
toon, which she then proceeds to learn to fly (Bengson & Moffett 2011b,
pp. 172-173)24.
B&M’s diagnosis of the KYTOON case is interesting. Theywrite that although the
information Chris has at the time of her decision to build the kytoon is inadequate to
build a kytoon, ‘there is a clear sense inwhich her situation is not hopeless. Her current
information state, coupled with the information she will encounter once she performs a
Google search, will together be sufficient to reliably build a kytoon’ (Ibid., p. 173, our ital-
ics). B&M reason from this observation to the conclusion that, consequently, ‘Chris
is, at the time of her decision, reliably able to build a kytoon’ even though, at the time
of her initial decision ‘she does not know how to φ (build a kytoon)’ (Ibid., p. 173).
23Of course, this is not to say that wemight, in a lax conversational context, use the term ‘knows-how’
when describing such an individual, vis-à-vis, '. But note that such an attribution is ‘honorific’ in the
sense that we are making an honorific attribution of knowledge-how to an elevator when saying that the
elevator ‘knows which floor we are on’ or that the computer knows how to cool itself down. While such
attributions are not uncommon, they are not picking out the kind of relation that is at issue between
intellectualists and anti-intellectualists.
24Note that B&Mappeal toKYTOONas a purported counterexample to aweaker andmore restricted
version of the sufficiency thesis, according to which reliably being able to intentionally do something is
sufficient for knowing how to do that thing. For our purposes, we think KYTOON is problematic against
both the standard and weaker versions of AI-S.
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Aswith the SALCHOWcase, KYTOON is onewherewe grant that the protagonist
lacks know-how. However, we think there is a respect in which SALCHOW actually
does better than KYTOON. In SALCHOW, Irina we saw lacked the ability to do a
salchow despite being reliably able (in the sense that she can reliably do) a salchow.
(This was why SALCHOW, though not effective against AI-S, was at least effective
against the implausibly formulatedAI-SW). InKYTOON, by contrast, we submit that,
at least as the case is described, Chris not only lacks the ability to make a kytoon at
t (the time of her decision) but moreover, it is problematic to say she reliably can do
so, at t—at least, on the basis of the rationale B&M offer. B&M’s diagnosis of the
case relies on a background assumption to the effect that: an agent A can reliably ' at
some time τ provided that the following two conditions hold: A’s current information
state at  coupled with the information that, at  A will encounter, will be sufficient to
reliably'. But brief reflection shows this general principle to be lacking. Just consider
the following case:
SPEECH: Wesley is supposed to recite, as part of a school production, a
key paragraph from Winston Churchill’s famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech.
Wesley’s present information at t1 includes the line: ‘From Stettin in the
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an ‘Iron Curtain’ has descended across
the continent.’ Wesley, due to a poor memory, can’t remember the rest.
However, at t1, given antecedent events and conditions in conjunction
with laws of nature, Wesley will (at t2) acquire a piece of paper blowing
in the wind, which contains the remainder of the speech.
Because Wesley is such that, at t1 his present information state plus the informa-
tion he at t1 will acquire are sufficient for reliably reciting the ‘Iron Curtain’ speech25,
the rationale B&M rely on in the KYTOON case imply that Wesley can reliably recite
the Iron Curtain speech at t1—though that is absurd. KYTOON is a case where the
protagonist (at the time of the decision to make the kytoon) not only lacks an ability
to do so, but moreover, it’s implausible that Chris reliably can build a kytoon at t given
the explanation B&M advert to.
Of course, we leave it open that perhaps a better explanation could be formulated
for why Chris is reliably able to build a kytoon at t1. For instance, we might imagine
the following adjustment: suppose that we hold fixed the information Chris already is
said to have at t1 and then say that at t2 Chriswillnon-accidentally acquire information
that at t2 will suffice for Chris tomake the kytoon. Evenwith this caveat, it’s hard to see
how KYTOON is going to count against AI-S as opposed to merely the (implausibly)
25Note that we are relying on something like causal determinism in interpreting our ‘will’ in a way
that is no different than B&M rely on this idea in articulating why it is that Chris can reliably build a
kytoon at the time of his initial decision.
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inclusive version of the sufficiency thesis—viz., that one knows how to' provided one
reliably can '. But a case that counts against version of the thesis is, to reiterate, not
thereby a case that counts against the reasonable articulation of the position in terms
of ability possession.
3. pavese’sargumentfromrulefollowing: the ‘brainiac’ case
In recent work, Carlotta Pavese (e.g., 2015a) has attempted to defend what she calls
‘traditional intellectualism’, according to which knowing how is propositional in char-
acter, over an increasingly popular rival position she terms ‘non-propositional cogni-
tivism’, the view that ‘know how is a cognitive state, but one with a non-propositional
content’ (2015, 165), for example, the state of knowing a rule. Pavese attempts to show
that, as she puts it, ‘rule-following abilities are blind and adrift in absence of a doxastic
attitude that allows the subject to deploy those abilities relevantly and intentionally’
(166).
For our purposes, what’s relevant is that a kind of thought experiment Pavese ap-
peals to in the service of distinguishing favourably her brand of intellectualism from
non-propositional cognitivism also appears to count against more traditional forms
of anti-intellectualism, specifically, by counting against the claim that being reliably
able to ' is sufficient for knowing how to '.
Pavese’s example is very creative, and appeals to a fictional game, ‘BRAINIAC’.The
example can be appreciated in connection with chess, which is commonly analysed
using algebraic notation, where the chessboard is represented by a list of binary codes
which themselves represent chess positions and the pieces that are in those positions
(175).
As Pavese notes, the rules of chess are translatable into functions that map binary
codes into sets of binary codes, which ‘correspond to a piece’s possible movements
given a certain position. In these analyses, numbers clearly are meant to stand for
pieces and positions and the functions aremeant to stand for the rules governing those
positions’ (175).
These points about chess in hand, Pavese’s example involves two key components;
Firstly, she envisions a fictional game, BRAINIAC, and secondly, she envisions a par-
ticular way in which this game might be played. Regarding the first component:
Pavese tells us that BRAINIAC is a game that involves abstractly manipulating num-
bers and where ‘those numbers are not thought to stand for anything in particular
besides themselves’. As it turns out, though, there is a perfect isomorphism between
BRAINIAC’s rules and strategies and chess’s algebraically formulated rules and strate-
gies, despite these being different games26. Against this background, now imagine a
26See (2015a, 175) for Pavese’s arguments for why these games are different.
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special circumstance in which BRAINIAC is played:
BRAINIAC: Now imagine Miriam who, blind since birth and exception-
ally gifted at mentally manipulating numbers, has always only played
BRAINIAC in her life. She has never heard of ordinary chess and does not
know such game even exists. So, she has absolutely no thoughts (whether
de dicto or de re) about it. As it happens, Miriam regains her sight and
once she runs into a chessboard. Miriam is not sure how to use that ob-
ject and has absolutely no clue that the chessboard is used to play a game.
But she soon conjectures and comes to believe that it might be a dadaist
reenactment of a medieval battle. Spontaneously, however, she starts as-
signing positions and pieces on the chessboard with numbers and apply-
ing to those the rules of BRAINIAC. She says to herself: “I may as well
use this dadaist reenactment to play BRAINIAC!” […]Without thinking
about other possible mappings and with a bit of luck, Miriam ends up
mapping the rule and strategy of BRAINIAC onto a set of rules that hap-
pens to correspond to (Chess). She memorizes those rules perfectly well
and mentally practices to move the pieces on the chessboard according
to those rules. So, it is true now of Miriam that, if she were now to try to
move the pieces on the chessboard according to those rules, she would
end up correctly playing what is in fact chess. So, Miriammust now have
the ability to follow the rules for playing chess on the chessboard. […]
[C]onsider Miriam […] just before she starts playing BRAINIAC on the
chessboard. Does Miriam know how to play chess27?
One might initially balk at this example because some rules of chess, including
basic rules such as the ‘touch move rule28’ are in principle inapplicable in the case of
BRAINIAC, which calls into doubt whether the rules of BRAINIAC could be perfectly
isomorphic with the rules of chess. But let’s set this aside.
In Pavese’s example, it does seem as though Miriam is reliably able to play chess.
She has, as Pavese claims:
‘the ability to follow the rules that happen to be the rules for chess. Hence,
she knows the rules for chess. Yet she cannot be correctly described as
knowing how to play ordinary chess.’ […] rule-following abilities are blind
27Thanks to an anonymous referee at Pacific Philosophical Quarterly for drawing our attention to this
case.
28The touch-move rule in chess specifies that, when it is a player’s turn to move, that player inten-
tionally touches a piece on the board, then the player must move or capture that piece provided that it is
legal to do so. https://www.chess.com/article/view/the-touch-move-rule
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and adrift without a propositional attitude. In particular, a propositional
attitude of belief is needed to direct the relevant rule-following abilities
it is needed to bring to bear relevantly and intentionally to the practical
situations at hands; it is needed for one to have the ability to intentionally
execute the task (2015a, 179-80).
Of course, if this assessment of BRAINIAC is correct, and Miriam has the (re-
liable) ability to play chess despite not knowing how to play chess, then BRAINIAC
seems to count straightforwardly againstAI-S, independently ofwhatever further points
the case can be used to make about rule-following.
Pavese quickly anticipates one natural line of response. Perhaps Miriam fails to
know how to play chess de dicto in the situation described while nonetheless possess-
ing knowledge-how to play chess de re. It might then be argued that providedMiriam
possesses de re knowledge how to play chess, this is enough for the case to satisfy the
anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis. Pavese’s response, however, is to simply deny
that Miriam actually does know how to play chess de re. This is because, ‘she cannot
have de re beliefs about chess, for she has neither encountered the game before nor
seen it played. So, she cannot intend to play chess de re. But if she cannot intend to
play chess, de re, she cannot intentionally play chess, de re, for intending toφis a nec-
essary condition forφ-ing intentionally’. And provided it is granted that one knows
how to play chess only if one has the ability to intentionally play chess—a principle
Pavese regards to be a plausible one—then Miriam thus does not know how to play
chess de re.
WefindPavese’s argument highly creative, thoughwe think the case’s anti-intellectualist
import can be disarmed. Firstly, the reader might note that the principle Pavese ap-
peals to—what she callsNew Principle29—is one that the anti-intellectualist is not only
free to adopt, butmust adopt (provided the anti-intellectualist doesn’t want to rule-in
know-how in the case of non-intentional activities, such as digestion). The principle,
states: One knows how to φ just in case one has the ability to intentionally φ. Pavese
remarks that, at least for the purpose of her diagnosis of BRAINIAC, she is only re-
lying on the left-to-right reading of the biconditional according to which knowing
how to φ is sufficient for the ability to intentionally φ. This is tantamount to the anti-
intellectualist’s necessity thesis.
Of course, Pavese doesn’t regard herself as conceding anything to the anti-intellectualist
by embracing New Principle. This is because she thinks that intellectualism, as she’s
defending the view, can accommodate the principle (see 2015b, §530). Given, though,
that the anti-intellectualist also endorses the left-to-right reading of New Principle
29Ibid., p. 174.
30See also Pavese (2015b), in which she offers her own account of practical senses.
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which Pavese is appealing to, the anti-intellectualist is in a position to offer an anti-
intellectualist-friendly diagnosis of BRAINIAC.We can agreewith Pavese thatMiriam
cannot intend to play chess de re becauseMiriam cannot have de re beliefs about chess,
having never encountered it. And we can further agree that she Miriam can’t intend
to play chess, de re, because intending to φ is a necessary condition for φ-ing inten-
tionally. But from these observations, the anti-intellectualist is entitled to offer this
diagnosis: BRAINIAC counts against the sufficiency thesis only if Miriam really does
have the reliable ability to play chess while not knowing how to play chess. Any force
the example has against the anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis dissolves if we have
cause to deny Miriam such an ability. But as we’ve seen, Pavese offers us a rationale
for denyingMiriam such an ability: Miriam, the anti-intellectualist can say, lacks such
an ability because she cannot intentionally play chess. BRAINIAC is thus compatible
with Miriam’s having the reliable ability to play chess—something she has only if she
is able to intentionally play chess—being sufficient for knowing how to play chess.
At this point, however, the intellectualist has a potential counter-reply waiting in
the wings31: the ability to execute intentions in action is either primitive or requires
a further explanation in terms of something more basic. Here, though, the intellec-
tualist may appear to have an advantage. As Pavese notes, the intellectualist provides
an account of the ability to intentionally φ that is independently motivated by several
prominent views in action theory, in terms of a propositional attitude (2015a, 186).
By contrast, the anti-intellectualist must either (i) take such an ability as a primitive—
a move that has been defended by Setiya (2013)—(ii) invoke a propositional attitude
in a way that can be defended as unobjectionable by anti-intellectualist lights, or (iii)
explain an ability to execute intentions in actions in a way that does not invoke propo-
sitional attitudes. Which of the strategies the anti-intellectualist should embrace is not
a matter that we’ll take a stand on here. Even if the dialectical burden remains with
the anti-intellectualist on this point, BRAINIAC is a decisive counterexample only if
each of these options must be unworkable, something that the intellectualist has not
shown. Equally, though, defending one such option compellingly remains required
for the anti-intellectualist to disencumber herself from this precarious position32.
4. concluding remarks
We’ve attemptedhere to disarma recent strandof attack leveled against anti-intellectualist
accounts of knowledge-how. In particular, we’ve shown that recent counterexamples
to the claim that ability possession is sufficient for knowledge-how, ultimately provide
31Pavese (2015a, 186, fn. 26) anticipates a reply along these lines.
32Thanks to an anonymous referee at Pacific Philosophical Quarterly for helpful comments at this
point in the dialectic.
22
no compelling reason to resist the anti-intellectualist’s core thesis—that knowing how
to do something is a matter of ability possession, rather than propositional attitudes.
To be clear, the argument sketched here has not gone so far as to positively endorse
the anti-intellectualist thesis. For all we’ve said here, both intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism remain live options. More specifically, we hope to have shown is that
anti-intellectualism cannot be dismissed so easily as B&M and Pavese’s counterexam-
ples would suggest. If one is to be an intellectualist at the end of the day, it should thus
be for reasons other than that this particular commitment of the view—e.g. that pos-
sessing the relevant abilities suffices for knowledge-how—can be so easily dismissed
by counterexample.
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